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Abstract: To an extent never seen before, following the 
collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998 Islamist groups in 
Indonesia began to express themselves vocally and expli-
citly. Islamic discourse has developed apace, ranging from 
demands that the state lift the ban on the role of Islamic 
ideology in political parties and mass organizations to 
accommodate Muslim interests up to calls for the imple-
mentation of Islamic shari>` ah to replace the so-called 
secular laws of state. These recent phenomena indicate the 
emergence of new santris (devout Muslims) differing from 
their own parents and the older generation in terms of 
political orientation, religious ideology, and attitude 
towards inherited traditions. These new types of santri are 
not only influenced by the local and changing dynamics of 
Indonesian politics, society and culture but they are also 
subject to international influences in Islam. Within 
Indonesia, some of them retain their links with 
traditionalist or modernist groups, some others keep their 
distance from them and yet still others show radical 
orientations. They have become very influential within 
certain sections of Indonesian society and have gained 
attention from many observers and researchers. 
Keyword: Convergent santri, radical santri, global santri, 
religious ideology. 
Introduction 
This paper analyses the early development of the new santri during 
the time of the consolidation of Soeharto’s New Order up until its 
collapse in 1998. We introduce three types of new santri: convergent, 
radical and global. While these are not rigid classifications, the three 
variants can be explained by affiliation with different groupings within 
Indonesian Islam. Santri described as “convergent” are both 
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traditionalist and modernist activists who tend to merge with each 
other. The “radical” santri are usually pessimistic about the traditio-
nalist and modernist struggles in Islam and demand radical change in 
Indonesia. The “global” santri are more influenced by trans-national 
movements in the Middle East, yet still form part of both traditionalist 
and modernist groupings at home. Our approach is based on an 
analysis of the doctrinal origins and the religious agendas of these 
contemporary santri in order to better understand the emergence of the 
Jemaah Tarbiyah. The activists of PKS are mainly drawn from 
members of Jemaah Tarbiyah, who fall into the category of global 
santri.  
 An identification of the santri in Indonesia was made through the 
useful work of the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz. In his study of the 
religious life in the town of “Mojokuto", East Java, during the 1950s, 
Geertz classified the Javanese into three variants, priyayi, santri and 
abangan. Although his work has drawn criticism from many scholars, 
the santri-abangan dichotomy is still important for an understanding of 
the religious and political orientations of Muslims in Indonesia. Santri, 
or observant Muslims are further divided into two groups, kolot 
(traditionalist) and moderen (modernist).1 The former, following Geertz, 
accommodated local practices and rituals in their Islam and affiliated 
politically with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) whilst the latter were 
determined to purify Islamic teachings from local syncretic practices 
and preferred to join Masyumi.2 
About twenty years later, another distinction between traditionalist 
and modernist was made by Allan A. Samson. He described them as 
politically accommodationist or reformist in nature. Samson then 
added a further type of santri, which he named “radical 
fundamentalist”. This new category is indeed helpful for our 
understanding of the reality of santri in Indonesia, in addition to the 
two already acknowledged variants.3 The fundamentalist element of 
santri was attributed to the Darul Islam movement of the 1950s, which 
launched a rebellion against the new Indonesian state, aiming to 
                                                 
1 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: the Free Press, 1960), p. 129. 
2 Ibid., pp. 148-176 
3 Allan S. Samson, “Army and Islam in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs 44 no. 4 (Winter 
1971-1972), p. 549. 
  71 
The Emergence of New Santri in Indonesia 
71 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 02, Number 01, June 2008 
establish an Indonesia Islamic State.4 The continuation of 
fundamentalist groups from the past, as classified by Samson, bears a 
correlation to radical groups of the present which has contributed to 
violent actions. In this thesis we call this category of santri, “radical” 
santri. 
However, merely relying on the received insights of Geertz, 
Samson and other scholars will not provide us with a satisfactory 
picture of the recent face of Islam in Indonesia. Various events have 
taken place since the New Order period, which have changed the face 
of the old santri; a new concept, which I present in this article, is 
needed to explain these recent developments.   
Factors behind the Emergence of New Santri 
The emergence of the new santri dates from the 1970s, when the 
younger generation of Indonesian Muslims began to demonstrate a 
growing distance from their elders. This phenomenon resulted either 
in the process of convergence between traditionalism and modernism 
or in a process of alienation. The former contributed to a new strategy 
in promoting Islam through democratic structures, while the latter 
tended towards a radical orientation. The New Order regime’s 
repression of political Islam, the extension of religious education in 
public schools and the prominence of international events in the 
Middle East were important factors contributing to the gulf between 
the younger generation and their predecessors.  
Repression and the Failure of Political Islam 
The two-pronged policy of the New Order towards Islam in 
Indonesia was responsible for the decline of the forces of political 
Islam. The regime repressed “organised Islam” and maintained 
cooperation with and co-option of Islamic representation that was 
non-political in nature. It was eager to exclude politicised Muslims 
because of the threat to the stability of the regime, should they increase 
their influence in society and in government affairs.5 Since Muslim 
politicians enjoyed “genuine popular support”, they indeed posed 
potent threats. On the other hand, nominal Muslims accused them of 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Harold Crouch, “Islam and Politics in Indonesia,” in Politics, Diplomacy and Islam: Four 
Case Studies (Canberra: Department of International Relations, The Australian National 
University, 1986), p. 15. 
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having an agenda to establish an Islamic state and to impose the 
shari>‘ah on those who did not wish to comply with the tenets of Islam.6 
The heavy-handed policies of the New Order towards political Islam 
led some Muslims to adopt a more pragmatic approach, avoiding 
formal political struggle and turning instead to cultural and social 
activities. Some of them even preferred to join government-sponsored 
associations and to become outright supporters of the regime.  
To cast our eyes further back in time, the fall of Soekarno and the 
establishment of the New Order in 1966 were welcomed optimistically 
by former members of Masyumi, which had been banned by Soekarno. 
In their view, the New Order promised to accommodate the forces of 
Islam, since they had contributed to the campaign to destroy the 
Communist Party of Indonesia. Islamic groups, particularly the 
modernists, hoped that the new regime would open up political 
opportunities to them. In August 1966, thousands of Muslims attended 
a public gathering held in Jakarta’s al-Azhar mosque, welcoming the 
release of political prisoners such as Hamka, Isa Anshary and 
Burhanuddin Harahap.7 Other important figures, such as Syafruddin 
Prawiranegara, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mohamad Roem, Kasman 
Singodimejo and M. Natsir appeared and gave orations appealing to 
the government to immediately rehabilitate Masyumi.   
The demands of the modernist activists did not gain much 
attention from the government, however. The military-backed regime 
affirmed its stance that its ally, the army, would not allow any political 
groups which had carried out “illegal actions and rebellion” against 
Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. The Communists, Darul Islam, 
Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia – 
PSI) were counted among such dissenting groups.8  
In preparing a new Islamic party, some former activists of 
Masyumi established a Co-ordinating Forum for Muslim Action 
(Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin, BKAM) and, with the support of 
sixteen other Islamic organizations, proposed a new political party, 
Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi). In February 1967 the ruling elite 
                                                 
6 Guy J. Pauker, “Indonesia in 1980: Regime Fatigue?” Asian Survey 21 no. 2 (February 
1981), p. 240. 
7 B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1971), p. 148. 
8 Ibid. 
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permitted the establishment of Parmusi but rejected the involvement 
of former Masyumi figures. The establishment of Parmusi was 
“recompensed” by the appointment of a Parmusi chairman who was 
chosen by the regime itself. The 1971 general elections then showed an 
ineffective performance by the party, when it gained only about 5 % of 
total votes, far below the achievement of the traditionalist party of 
Nahdlatul Ulama (19%). 
The success of the new regime in controlling modernist Muslim 
activists was followed by repression towards traditionalist groups as 
well. The NU, which had maintained a good rapprochement with the 
Old Order regime, had immediately joined forces with the army against 
the PKI during the tragic bloodshed of 1965. Even though NU was 
able to cooperate with other parties, including the PKI, under the 
Guided Democracy of Soekarno, in fact at the grassroots, members of 
NU were in deep conflict with the Communists. When armed clashes 
took place, NU was among those who harshly attacked Communist 
sympathisers. However, events around the 1971 general elections 
showed political competition between NU and the regime’s party, 
Golkar, which involved a terrorising of NU, when many NU 
campaigners were kidnapped and tortured by the supporters of the 
regime.9 NU then shifted its attitude from collaboration to 
confrontation, a turnabout that caused the government to respond by 
hardening its stance towards NU and the Muslim community in toto.10 
Under these conditions, the shift of the Islamic struggle from 
political into cultural orientations, focussing on intellectual life or on 
predication, enabled the two opposed traditionalist and modernist 
groups to encounter each other and to develop social networks. While 
the intellectually-oriented group tended to denounce Islamic parties, 
the predication-oriented group, with its non-partisan strategy, further 
chose not to vote during the general elections as golput (golongan putih, 
non voters). Thus it was that the two generations of traditionalists and 
modernists found themselves inclined to merge. They were able to 
dissolve the schism between traditionalist and modernist santri through 
                                                 
9 Ken Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study (Clayton: Centre of 
Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, 1974), p. 112.  
10 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratisation in Indonesia (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 92. 
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intra-organisational interaction, developing a growing acceptance of 
the idea that the truth might lie in synthesis rather than in antithesis.11 
The Impact of Religious Education  
Despite its policies adverse to politically organised Islam, the New 
Order regime served to expand the social role of Islam in other ways. 
The Soeharto government offered considerable support to missionary 
activities and religious education. Robert W. Hefner has presented a 
remarkable counter example of the process of Islamisation in his 
research on the region of Tengger in East Java.12 Bambang Pranowo 
has also illustrated a similar trend in a rising Islamisation in Central 
Java during the era of political restriction on the santri in general.13  
The double-edged policy of the New Order government towards 
Islam has created many speculations of its motives. Yet it was not a 
new policy. During the first half of the 20th century the Dutch colonial 
government of the East Indies practised precisely the same policy 
when it made the distinction between Islam as a religion and Islam as 
politics. The difference is that the Dutch government did not support 
the growth of Islam among the Indonesian people, while the Soeharto 
government did indeed cultivate a process of Islamisation.14  
The establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
Departemen Agama (Depag) was part of the role of the government to 
promote Islam.15 The function of this ministry was to ensure and 
preserve practice and belief within the five formal religions recognised 
in Indonesia. The first pillar of Pancasila, “the Oneness of God”, 
reflects the implicit responsibility of the state in maintaining the 
existence of these religions. Even though the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs was charged to serve the interest of all religions, since Islam is 
                                                 
11 R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: a Political Explanation,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 3 (August 1996), p. 623. 
12 Robert W. Hefner, “Islamising Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 46 no. 3 (1987), pp. 533-554. 
13 Bambang Pranowo, “Islam and Party Politics in Rural Java,” Studia Islamika I no. 2 
(1994), pp. 1-19. 
14 For further details about the Dutch policies in Indonesia, see Harry J. Benda, 
“Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in 
Indonesia,” The Journal of Modern History 30 no. 4 (December 1958), pp. 338-347. 
15 The establishment of Depag has been also considered as a political compensation 
for Muslims after the defeat of the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta). 
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embraced by the majority, it is obvious that the ministry became an 
affective agency in carrying out the agenda of Islamisation. During the 
1950s and the 1960s much attention was given to the organization, 
education and internal reinforcement of the Muslim community, as 
well as to the spread of Islam to the non-literate parts of the country. 
The Christians initially did not like the Ministry and opposed the 
intervention of the government in their affairs. Hinduism and 
Buddhism obtained a directorate within the Ministry not long after the 
late 1950s.16  
Few can deny that this ministry has served the interests of the 
santri at the levels of both government and grassroots.17 Nevertheless, 
B.J. Boland has disagreed about any dominant role of Islam within the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs and has argued that the department has 
served as an important medium in resolving problems between Islamic 
and secular oriented groups in the heated debate over the foundations 
of the Indonesian state.18 The involvement of the government in the 
area of religious practice among its citizens has contributed to 
eliminating barriers among the adherents of five legal religions in 
Indonesia.19  
One of the main implementations of state support is to ensure that 
students in public schools and universities receive religious education 
from teachers of their own religion. However, the commitment of the 
government to promote religion in educational institutions was a 
longstanding one, dating from the 1950s. It was Soekarno who issued 
the governmental decision Peraturan Pemerintah (Perpu) No. 4/1950, 
regulating universal instruction in religion through the collaboration of 
both the Department of National Education and the Department of 
Religious Affairs. 20 
President Soeharto confirmed this regulation at a meeting of 
People’s Consultative Assembly, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(MPR) in 1966. It is stated that religious education is a core subject for 
                                                 
16 Jacques Waardenburg, “Muslim and Other Believers: The Indonesian Case” in Islam 
in Asia II (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 32-33. 
17 Geertz, The Religion of Java, p. 200. 
18 Boland, The Struggle of Islam, p. 105. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. 110 
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all students from primary school to university.21 Recently, on 11 June 
2003 through debate and rejection from non-Muslim schools, this 
regulation has been validated by the government as the System of 
National Education Law (Undang-Undang Sistem Pendidikan National, UU 
Sisdiknas).22 This policy has brought about change in religious trends 
within schools and universities, so that many students have been able 
to learn and practise their religion. Along with the facilitation of 
religious instruction in public schools, religious activities involving 
students and teachers both have become more apparent. For instance, 
students may celebrate the high religious days (Hari-Hari Besar 
Keagamaan) and observe their religious obligations during the course of 
their studies. 
The vital role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in providing and 
supervising religious courses has made this ministry an arena of 
conflict between traditionalist and modernist Muslim groups. 
Motivated by the need to preserve their specific religious practices, 
which are based on the jurisprudential schools (madhhab), both 
traditionalists and modernists are in competition to secure the position 
of Minister of Religious Affairs for one of their own. Holding the 
position of Minister means securing more influence over thousands of 
teachers who are responsible for delivering the religious message to 
students. When, in 1971, NU lost the top leadership of the Ministry of 
Religion, its influence over religious training in the primary schools 
gradually diminished. Religious courses of instruction and textbooks 
published by the Ministry of Religion were perceived by the 
traditionalist group as substantially promoting non-traditionalist 
views.23  
However, teachers of religion in primary schools have the right to 
teach Islam in a way that is suited to their students. The teaching of 
religion in the universities is more open and might well accommodate 
both traditionalist and modernist views of Islam. Lecturers are not able 
to impose their own understanding of religious matters, rather it is 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 See “Tidak Mudah Bagi Pemerintah Penuhi Amanat UU Sisdiknas,” Kompas, 17 June 
2003. 
23 Andree Feillard, “Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia” in Islam in an Era of 
Nation States:Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 143. 
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expected that they maintain a balance and discuss fairly the various 
understandings of Islam.  
Through their religion classes, university students are no longer 
concerned with sectarian differences and tend to share traditionalist 
and modernist practices equally. Thus government policy has been 
responsible for the dilution of traditionalist-modernist antipathies. 
Students tend to practise Islam in simple ways that are suited to their 
needs. Since the campuses also provide many extra-curricular Islamic 
training courses and activities, students are at an increased risk of being 
diverted from mainstream Islam. They feel no need to visit mosques 
outside their campus to interact with traditionalist or modernist 
organizations.24 However, since they are not sufficiently trained in 
traditional and classical Islam, the chief the methodological avenues in 
deriving the laws of Islamic jurisprudence, they tend to be more literal 
in their understanding of Islam.25 
In the 1980s, Islamic student organizations were barred from the 
campuses. The Islamic Students Association, Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam (HMI) which had been very prominent during the 1960s and 
1970s, was no longer able to recruit the best students from the 
prestigious secular campuses.26 Leading student association figures 
became more interested in organisational issues and campus politics in 
order to control student executives, abandoning their duties of 
religious training and predication.27  
However, it was not only Muslim groups that saw the Minister of 
Religious Affairs as a crucial post, the regime also found that the 
ministry was a significant tool of intervention in the daily affairs of 
Indonesian Muslims. Since the Soeharto regime was able to control the 
department, its minister could be kept in line with the government’s 
national policies. Soeharto discarded the influence of Islamic forces, 
traditionalist or modernist, by appointing the minister from elsewhere - 
the professional class, or even from the ranks of the armed forces.28  
                                                 
24 Kuntowijoyo, Muslim Tanpa Masjid (Bandung: Mizan, 2001), p. 133. 
25 Azyumardi Azra, “Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism” (Paper 
presented at The University of Melbourne, 6 April 2005), p. 5. 
26 Liddle, “The Islamic Turn, ” p. 625. 
27 Interview with Nur Mahmudi, Depok, 8 May 2003. 
28 Sidney Jones, “It Can’t Happen Here: A Post-Khomeini Look at Indonesian Islam,” 
Asian Survey 20 no. 3 (March 1980), p. 319. 
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International Influences 
The encounter of Indonesians with global issues and ideas 
occurred not only in the 1980s, particularly after the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, but it had developed centuries ago. Historically, since the 
late 15th century it was the h}aramayn, the two holy Arabian cities of 
Mecca and Medina that were considered to be the hub of the global 
network of Islam.29 Scholars in both cities developed their authority 
throughout the Muslim world. They not only judged to issues within 
their region but also gave responses to many questions sent by 
Muslims from around the world. Contact between Muslims of the 
Indonesian archipelago and the Middle East had become significant 
since the late 16th century and developed intensively in the late 19th 
century.30 Certain Meccan scholars, for instance, were involved in 
religious issues arising in Indonesia, including the sending of a decree 
to topple a woman, Sultanah Kamalat Syah of Aceh of the late of 17th 
century, from rule in accordance with the prohibition against a woman 
leading a kingdom.31 The capacity of Indonesian Muslims to 
accommodate foreign and local elements together resulted in the 
internalising of the global element into local beliefs. Indonesian Islam 
was thus distinct in nature in from its Middle Eastern counterpart.32  
Since the 1980s, the global influences of Islam on Indonesian 
Muslims have become more apparent. This “globalised” phenomenon 
of Indonesian Islam is the result more of a direct imitation of 
international orientations than a reliance on local traditions. Socio-
political events in the Middle East, including religious conflicts and 
scholarly schisms, have had a large impact upon Indonesian Muslims.  
Since the adoption of international ideas is not monopolised by 
any single figure or source of religious authority, their manifestations in 
Indonesia have been varied. Middle-East-replicated movements have 
mushroomed in Indonesia, each developing its own channels of 
contact and networks with Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, India and Pakistan. 
The emergence of movements such as the Muslim Brothers (Egypt), 
the Salafi groups (Saudi Arabia), Hizbut Tahrir (Jordan) and Jemaah 
                                                 
29 Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Global dan Lokal Islam Nusantara (Bandung: Mizan, 2002), 
p. 64. 
30 Azra, “Islam in Southeast Asia,” p. 7. 
31 Azra, Jaringan Global dan Lokal Islam Nusantara, p. 67. 
32 Ibid., p. 18. 
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Tabligh (Indo- Pakistan) are significant evidence that trans-national 
movements have seeded their influences in Indonesia. 
Historically, the more apparent influence of the Middle East-based 
movements in Indonesia was due to the outreach of Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) under the leadership of M. Natsir, who 
personally established good relations with Middle Eastern leaders. 
Concerned about the expansion of the renewal movement and its 
secular orientation, DDII sent many students to study in Middle 
Eastern universities, in order to balance the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs’ program led by Munawir Syadzali (1983-1993) who preferred 
to send young scholars to educational institutions in the United States 
and to Western Europe.33 Barred from domestic political participation, 
Natsir earned a high reputation in Middle-East Muslim countries. He 
has won credentials recognised by most international Muslim leaders 
and DDII has benefited from connections with donors in Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan to finance its domestic programs. To 
some extent, the sponsorship of DDII has meant that hundreds of 
Indonesian students have obtained international degrees, in turn 
helping to maintain cadres who are committed to global awareness and 
to anti-liberal Islam.34 Since the 1970s and 1980s, the oil boom has 
permitted more funds for religious scholarship programs and the 
number of Indonesian students in Middle-Eastern countries has 
multiplied.   
The era since the 1970s has also witnessed the translation of 
hundreds of books from Arabic into Indonesian. In Nasir Tamara’s 
observations of the 1980s Islamic revival, he was amazed at the 
numbers of Islamic publications and the extent of publishing activity. 
Most books were not just about ritual obligations but carried a concern 
for social and political problems as well. For instance, translations of 
the writings of Sayyid Qut}b were very popular.35 Subsequently, during 
the mid-1980s, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas was 
not confined to the medium of translated of books, but direct personal 
                                                 
33 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 110. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Nasir Tamara, Indonesia in the Wake of Islam: 1965-1985 (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 6. 
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contact between Indonesian students and Middle Eastern mentors was 
also very likely to occur.36  
The homecoming of Middle Eastern graduates and their 
interactions with the younger Muslim generation in the secular 
campuses of Indonesia introduced more comprehensive and 
systematic models of Islamic movements and thought. The Middle 
Eastern graduates became actively involved in predication, preferring 
neither to become government employees nor to return to their old 
Islamic institutions (pesantren) to teach. They remained independent 
and set up their own Islamic institutions, called ma`had, in urban 
centres where they became involved in providing informal religious 
instruction to students in their surrounds. Rahmat Abdullah, a Jemaah 
Tarbiyah activist, acknowledged the role of one Middle Eastern 
graduate: 
In 1980, my teacher returned from his study in Egypt. He 
had joined IM [Ikhwanul Muslimin, The Muslim Brothers] 
training, and had brought back many IM books. One of his 
books was written by Sayyid Hawa [and translated to 
Indonesian as] Risalah Perjuangan (Message of Struggle). 
My teacher and I then established an Islamic boarding 
school, Rumah Pendidikan Islam Darut Tarbiyah (the 
House of Islamic Education)…37  
Variants, Characteristics, and Groupings 
Viewing the 1970s and 1980s political and intellectual phenomena 
among Indonesian Muslims, Syafii Anwar indicated the significant 
growth of a younger generation that differed from their predecessors. 
He called this new type of santri “neo-santri”. While the “old santri” 
kept their links with established Islamic parties and groupings, the 
“neo-santri” are identified by their disengagement from political 
activity.38  In general, what Anwar means by “old santri” is the grouping 
of political Islam, whilst “neo-santri” stands for cultural Islam. In 
addition, the neo-santri, according to Anwar, has not directly 
experienced the political repression of the New Order regime; they 
learned politics chiefly from their involvement with Islamic student 
                                                 
36 Interview with Sholeh Drehem, Surabaya, 13 March 2003. 
37 Interview with Rahmat Abdullah, Jakarta, 11 May 2003. 
38 Syafii Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik Tentang 
Cendekiawan Muslim Order Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), pp. 128-133. 
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organizations.39 They have not held hard and fast attitudes on ideology, 
but have inclined towards more pragmatic, rational and receptive 
approaches. Their attitude towards Islam is based on its substance and 
functions, not on Islamic symbols or a literal understanding of texts. 
The new santri, Anwar claims, are the new Muslim middle class and the 
embryo of what he calls “cendekiawan muslim” (Muslim intellectuals) 
who were later to form the organization, Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectual Association, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia 
(ICMI).40 
However, Anwar appears not to have been aware of the different 
character of the new santri that developed within the university 
campuses after the mid 1980s. The neo-santri variant as described by 
Anwar puts more emphasis on only one side of the convergence 
phenomenon, that is, the intellectual convergence between the 
traditionalist NU and the modernist Muhammadiyah, which has 
lessened the differences between them. He pays little attention to the 
development of the predication movement, which is quite separate 
from the renewal movement in its orientation. This is the specific 
character of younger Muslims who have not only loosened their ties 
with both NU and Muhammadiyah but also show a tendency to be 
attracted to international ideas. All of these different variants, 
characters and groups of new santri deserve more elaboration in 
explaining the phenomena of contemporary Islam in Indonesia. 
Table 1: Attitudes of New Santri  in Indonesia 
Types of 
New 
Santri 
Mainstream 
Scholars 
Traditionalist 
and 
Modernist 
Practice 
Salafus Salih 
(trustworthy 
ancient 
scholars) 
Muslim 
world 
issues 
critical 
Democracy 
Convergent 
(1970s) 
Critical Agree Critical Critical Strongly 
agree 
Radical 
(1980s) 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
disagree 
Global 
(1990s) 
Critical Critical Agree Strongly 
agree 
Critical 
  
Level of acceptance : (1). Strongly Agree; (2).  Agree; (3). Critical;  
  (4). Disagree; (5). Strongly disagree.  
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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The table 1 shows the types of new santri in Indonesia, their 
character and attitudes toward traditionalist and modernist traditions. 
It also shows how they are diverse in responding contemporary issues, 
including democracy. 
Convergent Santri (the 1970s) 
To some extent, the convergence between traditionalist and 
modernist groups signified the trend of new generation of Indonesian 
Muslims in the 1970s. They initiated modifications in religious 
practices and sought to enrich their understanding of Islam by reading 
alternative Islamic books from overseas (Middle East and the West).41 
In addition, having witnessed the poor relations between the regime 
and Muslim activists, which were due to the unwillingness of the New 
Order regime to accommodate their political interests, the new 
generation of Indonesian Muslims in the 1970s, particularly the 
modernists, focussed their energy into two types of activities: renewal 
and a missionary movement. Many Islamic activities were embarked 
upon, such as discussion groups, seminars and dialogue that brought 
figures from both traditionalist and modernist camps to discuss Islamic 
and national issues. More and more, the younger generation were 
involved in formal and informal meetings to discuss Indonesian and 
Islamic issues in a broad context.42  
a) Renewal Movement 
Initiated by Nurcholish Madjid, the chairman of the Muslim 
Student Association, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) the advent of 
the renewal movement in the 1970s gained momentum and drew 
much attention from Muslim activists who had become disinclined to 
continue the struggle of Islam through political party channels.43 They 
changed their structural approach into a more cultural one, from a 
symbolic and formalistic approach to a substantive one. By promoting 
political accommodation, the prevailing tension between Muslims and 
the regime was gradually reduced. It was this cultural method of 
                                                 
41 Kuntowijoyo, “Konvergensi Sosial dan Alternatif Gerakan Kultural,” Pesantren 3 no. 
3 (1986), pp. 6-7. 
42  Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam di Indonesia, p. 125. 
43 Nurcholish Madjid was considered as the pioneer of the Islamic renewal movement. 
See Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di 
Indonesia (Jakarta:Paramadina, 1998), p. 136. 
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cooperation that enabled Muslims to influence the existing political 
system from within.44 Bachtiar Effendy pointed out that this change 
led to what he called the emergence of a “new Islamic intellectualism” 
in Indonesia. According to Effendy, the movement contributed to 
better relations between Muslims and the regime by focussing on three 
activities-religious renewal, political reformism and social transfor-
mation.45 
Religious renewal was carried out in an effort to solve theological 
and philosophical problems of political Muslims in their relations with 
the state. The understanding of the old generation of Muslims towards 
the lack of separation between Islam and the state was the main 
concern for the renewal group. Effendy explains that the older 
theological stance, which tended to be more formalistic, legalistic and 
literal to the younger generation needed to be adjusted to respond to 
the social and political realities in Indonesia. They did not intend to 
change the doctrines of Islam, but rather to mount an effort to refresh 
Muslims’ understanding of their religion. They did not believe that 
Islam constitutes an ideology, since the Qur’an and Hadith do not 
command Muslims to establish a state based on Islamic ideology. 
Therefore, Muslims had to be committed to the universal values of 
Islam, not to institutions and organisations, including political parties.46  
In addition, in order to revise critical relations between the state 
and Islam, the renewal movement’s solution was through involvement 
within the system. This political reformism meant that Islam should 
not represent an oppositional force against the state; the most 
important effort for Muslims was to push the state to guarantee their 
freedom in observing Islamic teachings. These required its activists to 
play a role in the policy making process by joining the state’s 
bureaucrats and political parties.47  
This approach brought a significant change that led most former 
activists of Islamic organisations to accept the ideology of Pancasila 
                                                 
44 Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam di Indonesia, p. 8. 
45 Effendy, Islam dan Negara, p. 125. 
46 Ibid., p. 136. 
47 Ibid., p. 155. 
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and some even became part of the regime.48 The chairman and 
secretary-general of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi), 
Mintaredja and Sulastomo, served as the Minister of Social Affairs and 
was a bureaucrat in the Soeharto regime during the 1970s. After that 
other former Muslim activists have joined the regime. Among them 
were Sularso, Bintoro Tjokroaminoto, Barli Halim, Bustanul Arifin, 
Madjid Ibrahim, Norman Razak, Zainul Yasni, Omar Tusin, Sya’adilah 
Mursid, Mar’ie Muhammad, Hariry Hadi and many others.49 In fact, 
their involvement within the system has not only brought about 
reconciliation between the state and Islam but also contributed to the 
bringing together other elements of Muslim forces from various 
backgrounds to exert influence on the state.  
Another aspect of the renewal movement was the social 
transformation movement. The transformation movement aimed to 
strengthen the capacity of society in terms of social, cultural, political 
and economic improvement. Since the New Order regime was so 
effective in controlling the socio-political dimensions of the people at 
the grassroots, the transformation movement had to build 
communication and cooperation with the regime’s apparatus in order 
to run their programs.50 In addition, this approach also created good 
relations between traditionalist and modernist groups. Dawam 
Rahardjo, Sudjoko Prasodjo, and Adi Sasono were among the pioneers 
of the social transformation movement. For instance, the Institute of 
Social and Economic Research, Education and Information, Lembaga 
Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3S) 
was established in 1971 to strengthen the role of society and has 
become an important avenue for traditionalist and modernist activists 
to cooperate each other. 
Many figures from modernist-affiliated movements have 
supported the idea of renewal Islam, such as Usep Fathuddin dan 
Utomo Dananjaya from the Indonesian Muslim Students, Pelajar Islam 
Indonesia (PII), Dawam Rahardjo, Djohan Effendi and Ahmad Wahib 
from the “limited group” discussions in Yogyakarta. Although the 
                                                 
48 The spirit of reconciliation between the state and Islam evinced by Muslims’ 
acceptance of the ideology of Pancasila not only prevailed within modernist circles but 
was also followed by traditionalist organisations. 
49 Effendy, Islam dan Negara, p. 163. 
50 Ibid., p. 165. 
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traditionalist camp had been absent in the earliest days of the 
discourse, many from a traditionalist background subsequently 
contributed to shaping and expanding the new intellectual orientation 
after the arrival home of Abdurahman Wahid in 1971 from his study in 
Baghdad. Through discussions and intellectual exercises among the 
new generation of santri in the 1970s, those involved succeeded in 
bringing Muslim resources together and contributing to the Indonesian 
developmental program. This was the arena of the phenomenon of 
convergence, in which traditionalist and modernist views and groups 
reached mutual understanding and cooperation. These younger 
Muslim intellectuals held regular series of discussion in Jakarta.51 As 
former chairman of HMI, Nurcholish Madjid enjoyed good relations 
with influential figures from the modernist Masyumi, whilst 
Abdurahman Wahid had impeccable “blue blood” (darah biru) in the 
eyes of traditionalist NU stakeholders.52   
Criticism has been directed towards the renewal movement and 
other associated movements, because they have not engaged with 
wider public issues but tend to be elite and urban oriented. They have 
not been able to reach the Muslim grassroots, most of the Indonesian 
people. In order to be understood by ordinary Muslims, their discourse 
has needed to be “translated” by a second layer of spokesmen.53 For 
this reason, Islamic predication movements emerged to respond the 
needs of grassroots in understanding Islam. 
b) Predication Movement 
The predication movement represents yet another type of 
convergent santri. Disillusioned by the failure of their efforts to 
resurrect the Islamic party of Masyumi, certain modernist Muslims, led 
by M. Natsir, embarked on programs of propagation and predication. 
In May 1967 Natsir established an Islamic missionary institution, called 
the Indonesian Islamic Missionary Board, Dewan Dakwah Islam 
                                                 
51 Greg Barton, “Islam and Politics in the New Indonesia,” in Islam in Asia Changing 
Political Realities (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), p. 19. 
52 Recent developments of this santri stream have generated two further and 
complicated trends of neo-traditionalism and neo-modernism. The Liberal Islam 
Network, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) and the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual 
Network, Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM) are recent phenomena 
resulting from the long intellectual journey of the renewal movement. 
53 See Tempo, 3 April 1993. 
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Indonesia (DDII). By promoting Islamic preaching, activists of DDII 
hoped to persuade more Muslims to be aware of their religious and 
political obligations as citizens. Since they were unable to participate in 
formal political activity or to take part in influencing the state, da`wah 
activity became an alternative strategy to prepare cadres who would 
struggle for Islam in the future. It was believed that this kind of 
predication project would have a longer-term impact on the formation 
of the national leadership in Indonesia. As stated in the organisational 
goals of DDII, the institution itself originally aimed to serve as 
“laboratory and consultation for the effective propagation of Islam in 
modern society.”54 The inclination of the organization to become 
engaged in political issues has contributed to the weakening of its 
progress in general.55 Nevertheless, DDII became fertile ground to 
seed oppositional attitudes against the New Order regime.  
To realise its long-term goals, DDII needed to improve the social 
and educational levels of Muslim communities. DDII then worked 
closely with the Medical College of the Islamic Hospital Foundation, 
Yayasan Rumah Sakit Islam (Yarsi), a modernist oriented institution in 
Jakarta, in providing medical services for the urban poor and in 
helping to support the development of libraries in mosques, 
universities and in da`wah institutions. In addition to these programs, 
DDII assisted in developing modernist-oriented pesantren associations 
in Java and other areas, combining both Islamic and secular subjects. 56 
A private agriculture Pesantren of Darul Falah in Bogor, Dana al-Falah 
in Bandung, Wisma Tani in Payakumbuh and Yayasan al-Falah in 
Surabaya are examples of DDII-supported projects that are still well 
known up to the present time. 
Another of the important developments in DDII’s predication 
program was its success in expanding its role in the secular university 
campuses. DDII held many cadre-training programs in order to 
support this campus predication. One of these was held in Jakarta, 
organised by Z.E. Muttaqin and Imaduddin Abdulrahim, both 
important figures in Masyumi. Since the training took place on the 
                                                 
54 Muhammad Kamal Hasan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to New Order Modernisation in 
Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa and Pustaka, 1980), p. 70. 
55 Ridwan Saidi, “Dinamika kepemimpinan Islam,” in Islam in Indonesia: Suatu Ikhtiar 
Mengaca Diri” (Jakarta: CV Rajawali, 1986), p. 134. 
56 See Hasan, Muslim Intellectual Responses, p. 70. 
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premises of the Indonesian Pilgrim Committee, Panitia Haji Indonesia 
(PHI) in Jl. Kwitang, it was called the PHI training. More than 40 
delegates, mostly from prestigious universities in Bandung, such as the 
Institute of Technology of Bandung (ITB), the University of Pajajaran 
(Unpad) and the Institute of Education (IKIP) attended the training. 
The recruitment process was conducted through a network of 
modernist organizations, such as HMI, PII and Muhammadiyah. This 
PHI training first aimed to provide campuses with religious lecturers to 
be posted in the state universities and subsequently to become 
informal liaison officers of DDII on the campuses. 57 
In response to a growing numbers of PHI alumni, a campus 
network named the Indonesia Campus Mosque Supervision, Bina 
Masjid Kampus Indonesia (BMKI) was established throughout the 
universities of Java. Regional coordinators were appointed in order to 
manage predication programs and communications among the 
members. There were, for instance, Amien Rais, Kuntowijoyo and M. 
Mahyuddin as the coordinators for Yogyakarta; Ahmad Sadali, Rudy 
Syarif Sumadilaga and Yusuf Amir Feisal for Bandung; M. Daud Ali 
and Nurhay Abdurahman for Jakarta, Halidzi and Abdurrahman 
Basalama for Ujung Pandang, Kafiz Anwar for Semarang, and AM 
Saefuddin and Abdul Kadir Jaelani for Bogor.58 These leading figures 
subsequently have been widely acknowledged by university students, 
from both traditionalist and modernist families alike, as their patrons 
and main reference. 
Within other DDII liaisons, it was Imaduddin Abdurahim who 
succeeded in expanding campus predication in the 1970s. Besides his 
involvement in campus networks managed by DDII, Imaduddin 
initiated mental training sessions at the Institute of Technology in 
Bandung (ITB). These were called Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD) 
and succeeding drawing many students into the programs. Their 
alumni were widespread throughout universities in Java and the outer 
islands. Until the 1990s, Imaduddin was recognised as the “grand 
mentor” of Muslim student activists in the secular campuses. In terms 
of political stance, LMD was similar to DDII, in so far as both became 
opposition forces against the New Order regime. Imaduddin 
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Dakwah (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002), p. 161. 
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developed close contact with M. Natsir. He was not only from a 
modernist family background but he was active in modernist 
organizations, such as the Indonesian Islamic Students, Pelajar Islam 
Indonesia (PII) and the Islamic Student Association, Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Indonesia (HMI) in Bandung. He occupied a central 
position on the Board of Muslim Student Proselytising, Lembaga 
Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam (LDMI) of HMI.   
In fact, both the renewal and predication movements contributed 
to shaping the face of Indonesian Islam, in which young Muslims 
became more interested in making Islam “more relevant to life in the 
modern world.”59 They were no longer attracted to either the 
traditional, ritualistic dogma of the conservative `ulama>’ or the 
“messianic fervour of some modernists who want Indonesia to 
become a theocracy.”60   
Radical Santri (the 1980s) 
“Radical” here means “favouring or effecting fundamental or revo-
lutionary changes in current practices, conditions or institutions”.61 
The establishment of an Islamic state, therefore, would be the main 
agenda - to replace the existing state. In contrast, Islamic groups with a 
belief in the democratic systems, who channel their agendas through 
political parties and constitutional means, are considered to be 
“moderate”.  
Apart from the tendency to merge traditionalist and modernist 
thought and praxis in Indonesia, there has appeared a generation of 
Muslims who are disappointed with both of these mainstream views. 
They have developed their own ideas regarding religious, social and 
political issues. This type of santri has been much influenced by DI. 
What is more, this group is best identified by its close relations with 
ex-leaders of DI. Many reports about them in Indonesian newspapers 
and magazines have named this phenomenon, emerging since the mid 
1970s, in the form of neo-NII (Negara Islam Indonesia, the Indonesia 
                                                 
59 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability (St. Leonards: Allen 
and Unwin, 1999), p. 173. 
60 Ibid. 
61 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2000).   
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Islamic State) due to their close doctrinal and ideological affiliations 
with radical figures of DI.62   
Most radical Muslims are totally different from mainstream 
groups.63 Their understanding of the teachings of Islam and their 
radical views are the result of instant training and short courses. Some 
of them are even eager to simplify reality by making a basic contrast 
between what they term “Islamic” and “un-Islamic.” However, they 
are not well equipped with the foundations of the scholarship of 
Islamic jurisprudence or the Traditions of mainstream Islam, such as 
NU and Muhammadiyah possess; instead they rely on their own direct 
interpretations of the Qur’a>n and H{adi >th.    
According to Kuntowijoyo, the tendency to keep a distance from 
mainstream Islam in terms of ideological and physical interaction has 
led these younger Muslims to be further detached from the ummah, the 
Islamic community as a whole. This trend is part of an urban 
phenomenon in which alienation from wider society and exclusiveness 
in embracing religion become common. Peer groups and school 
affiliations become more important than association with conventional 
Islamic organizations. The kyai and `ulama>’ can no longer attract them 
to study and understand Islam in depth; rather they gain their 
information and religious knowledge from anonymous sources, such as 
cassettes, the internet, radio, television and books. 64 Even though a 
number of them have gained some mastery of Islamic knowledge, it 
has not been gained through intensive academic training. Objections to 
the authority of conventional Islamic organizations and scholars are 
not uncommon.  
Identified by their militancy and strict adherence, as well as their 
detachment from their elders, this younger generation make 
themselves more “pious” in their actions than the norm, without 
necessarily following the views and doctrines of established `ulama>’. 
Kuntowijoyo refers to this type of santri as Muslim Tanpa Masjid 
                                                 
62 Splinter groups of DI are Komando Jihad, Isa Bugis, Islam Jamaah, Islam Murni and 
Jemaah Islamiyah while figures, such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Irfan S. Awwas are 
allegedly known to be associated with DI/NII. Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 
Canberra, 1 August 2004. 
63 Tamara, Indonesia in the Wake of Islam, p. 6. 
64 Kuntowijoyo, Muslim Tanpa Masjid, p. 130. 
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(Muslims without Mosques)65 or, as the weekly magazine Tempo put it, 
as “Muslims without Custodians.”66  
Strictly speaking, the groups allegedly associated with radical 
activities in Indonesia since the 1980s are mainly referred to under the 
general name, NII, which later shifted into the more violent global 
movement of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Besides the movements working 
for an Islamic state, there are also a number of radical organizations 
that have targeted their actions towards places of vice. They have 
launched campaigns against prostitution, gambling, alcohol and drugs, 
sometimes resorting to physical attacks on places where such unlawful 
services are provided, such as massage parlours, bars, nightclubs and 
other sites of entertainment.67 Among these, the Front for the Defence 
of Islam, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Laskar Jihad and Laskar 
Jundulllah are radical groups that are not ideologically driven by the 
goal of an Islamic state but their presence in Indonesia has caused 
disturbances and has been cause for concern among many non-
Muslims. 
a) The Islamic State of Indonesia, Negara Islam Indonesia, NII 
The Darul Islam movement, founded and led by Kartosuwiryo, 
who established an Indonesian Islamic State, Negara Islam Indonesia 
(NII) on 7 August 1949, was finally crushed by the Indonesian army in 
the early 1960s. However, its informal network has never been totally 
destroyed. DI-associated underground movements have persisted until 
the present day.68 Instead of uniting themselves under a single 
leadership, they became separated and fragmented under different 
leaders. Each group has tried to annul other groups while claiming still 
to represent the “real” DI.69  
                                                 
65 Kuntowijoyo used the term, “Muslim Tanpa Masjid,” to identify the phenomenon of 
young Muslims in 1998. However, the 1970s and 1980s also witnessed the same trend, 
when many Muslims kept their distance from mainstream Islam. See Kuntowijoyo, 
Muslim Tanpa  Masjid,  p. 130. 
66 Tempo, 11 April 1981. 
67 See Sidney Jones, “Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims” ICG Indonesia Briefing 
(10 October 2001).  
68 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia,” South East Asia Research, 10 no. 2 (2002), p. 128. 
69 Widjiono Wasis, Geger Talangsari: Serpihan Gerakan Darul Islam (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 
2001), p. 179. 
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When the ima >m of Darul Islam was captured and many of his top 
deputies pledged allegiance to the government in exchange for 
amnesty, DI became leaderless.70 There was no single person who was 
considered qualified to take over the leadership. According to DI 
regulations on the issue of the central leadership, it was stated that any 
successor to the ima>m must be chosen from among the regional 
commanders and the members of the high command.71 Since all of 
these had taken an oath of loyalty to the national government in 1963, 
the only person who remained committed to the struggle was Abdul 
Fatah Wirananggapi, but he had been in prison since 1953.72 This 
uncertainty surrounding the central leadership has resulted in 
confusion among DI veterans in determining to whom loyalty must be 
given. Some local leaders of DI, who did not abandon the struggle for 
an Islamic state, started to exercise independent leadership. For 
instance, Ahmad Sobari who was DI district head of Priangan Timur, 
West Java, founded the Islamic State of Tejamaya.73   
Many splinter groups of Darul Islam are not linked directly to DI 
leaders, but they carry on the struggle for an Islamic state under the 
leadership of independent, low-ranking comrades. The policy of 
repression of the New Order towards the movement has led it into 
considerable disorientation. The important concern for the remaining 
activists is how to maintain the survival of the struggle for an Islamic 
state.74 They use this analogy: “since the loss of the big ship of DI, 
which carried out the struggle of the Islamic State, small lifeboats – 
called sekoci (an Indonesian term) must be immediately responsible for 
saving the struggle of the movement.”75  Some Islamic activists of the 
1980s have called those DI-associated movements that have recruited 
members from the campuses the Kelompok Sekoci (Sekoci Group), and 
therefore successors to NII. Among those Sekoci groups known for 
their involvement in violent action during the 1970s and 1980s was the 
                                                 
70 See Sidney Jones, “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian 
Embassy Bombing” ICG Asia Repost no. 92 (22 February 2005), p. 2.  
71 Ibid. 
72 “Tanya Jawab Estapeta Pemimpin NII dalam Darurat Perang,” 14 September 2002. 
73 Jones, “The Recycling Militants in Indonesia,” p. 3. 
74 See Tempo, 14 July 2002. 
75 Interview, Anonymous, Jakarta 4 March 2003. 
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Komando Jihad.76 Other groups have developed up to the present time 
under various leaders, such as Abdullah Sungkar, who died in Bogor, 
West Java in 2000 and was subsequently replaced by Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir. Sekoci groups nowadays are known by their clandestine 
activities. They continue to recruit new members and to obtain 
financial support to carry out their struggle. Newly inducted members 
are obliged to make monetary contributions. “Paradise is cheap, my 
brother. It only costs 20% of our income.”77 Those who cannot 
comply with this obligation will receive some form of penalty. Some 
members even go as far as stealing or robbing banks.78   
b) Jemaah Islamiyah 
The two best-known and allegedly central figures of Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) are Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, both of 
Hadhrami Arab descent. Even though many Indonesian Muslims still 
question the existence of JI, it has become clear that both Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir developed a Muslim group, called Jemaah Islam in the 1980s 
(not Jemaah Islamiyah).79 Both terms, “Jemaah Islam” and “Jemaah 
Islamiyah” have the same meaning; the difference is that the first is 
Indonesian whereas the second follows Arabic grammar (al-jama>’ah al-
isla>mi >yah in full). JI is an expanded version of the Darul Islam 
organization, formed in part when Ajengan Masduki was appointed to 
hold the caretaker leadership of DI when most of its leaders were 
arrested during the case of the Komando Jihad.80  
The main focus the Masduki cabinet was to develop international 
linkages and to support and strengthen DI military capacity. Abdullah 
Sungkar was appointed to assist Masduki in raising funds from Saudi 
                                                 
76 See Tempo 30 September 1978. 
77 In order to recruit new members, the NII approach was sometimes to kidnap the 
target and give indoctrination. For further details see “Jalan Pintas ke Surga, Katanya,” 
Tempo, 14 July 2002. 
78 There is the NII’s concept of fai, raising funds by attacking the enemies of Islam. 
However, what they call the enemies of Islam are not only non-Muslims but also 
fellow Muslims who are not members of the movement. For further details, see ICG 
report, “Al-Qaedah in Southeast Asia: the Case of the Ngruki Networks in Indonesia,” 
Indonesia Briefing (8 August 2002), p. 8. 
79 See Tapol, Indonesia: Muslims on Trial (London: the Indonesian Human Rights 
Campaign, 1987), pp. 91-92. 
80 Jones, “The Recycling Militants in Indonesia,” p. 21. 
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Arabia and the Ra<bit }ah, while another member of the top staff, Mia 
Ibrahim was asked to send DI recruits to Afghanistan. In 1988, 
Masduki, accompanied by Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and two 
others, left Indonesia with a DI delegation for Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
This travel linked DI with Abdul Rasul Sayaf of the Philippines and 
Abdullah Azam, a senior Mujahidin commander in Afghanistan.81 It 
exposed DI leaders to the challenge of extending their goals towards a 
broader, international caliphate. The trip gave rise to friction between 
Masduki and Sungkar, when Masduki, who could not speak Arabic, asked 
Sungkar to act as spokesman on behalf of the group. Sungkar did all the 
talking and deliberately excluded Masduki. This competition was intended 
to demonstrate the dominance of Sungkar over all Afghan veterans.82 
What is more, Masduki, who was of traditionalist NU inclination, became 
the target of criticism form the more “pure” Salafi-oriented contingent; 
Abdullah Sunkar and his networks often accused Masduki of practising 
what they called “un-islamic mysticism.”83  
In the event, the Afghan veterans joined in strengthening JI on 
their return to Indonesia and contributed to defining the targets of 
violence as not limited to the local enemy (the Soeharto regime) but to 
include attacks on what they perceived as the global enemies of Islam, 
such as the United States, the West and the Zionist conspiracy. Since 
then, radical Islamic groups in Indonesia have shown their 
international concerns in terms of their networks and alliances.  
Global Santri (the 1990s): The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah 
In contrast to their fellow Muslims who have embarked on radical 
action, there are some of the younger Muslim generation who find 
themselves unable to identify with either traditionalist or modernist 
life; they are more interested in trans-national movements. This new 
type of santri is known by its tendency to take on global issues within 
the Islamic world and to pay little attention to issues of national 
interest.84 It is a strategy to avoid repression by the regime in power. 
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Even though most of them have been frustrated and dissatisfied with 
the regime and its policies, they have sought to choose a different kind 
of resistance, setting themselves apart from political and social 
conditions through covert Islamic cultivation and predication, or 
tarbiyah.85   
Thus one of the most salient characteristics of Indonesian Muslims 
since the 1980s has been their tendency to connect themselves with 
global issues and movements. This has undermined the authority of 
local scholars in dealing with religious issues. They were considered to 
have been co-opted by the governing regime and so not to speak for 
the interest of the ummah. The younger generation of Indonesian 
Muslims has been attracted to foreign movements because of their 
“original” and “authentic” cachet and their image of not having been 
manipulated by the state.86 Jemaah Tarbiyah has adopted new models 
in carrying out its da`wah activities derived from the Muslim Brothers 
of Egypt, while other segments of Indonesian Muslims have blatantly 
imported the modus operandi of Middle Eastern movements into 
Indonesia, and the Salafi, Hizbut Tahrir and Jemaah Tabligh are 
examples of trans-national movements at work in Indonesia. 
They have attracted many Muslim youths to their new perspectives 
in understanding social and political realities, by focussing on an 
Islamic dissemination that is more visionary and organised.87  Instead 
of spending their energies in attacking the government, they have 
preferred to devout themselves to practising the basic teachings of 
their religion. They have tried to re-Islamise fellow Indonesian 
Muslims, particularly the youth and students, by improving the 
“quality” of individuals in terms of morality and behaviour. Having 
witnessed the process of forced de-politicisation and Muslim 
ineffectuality, they have eschewed political struggle in the short term, 
                                                                                                      
between Indonesian Muslims and Middle Eastern Muslim in the 20th century. See 
Martin van Bruinessen, “Global and Local in Indonesian Islam” Southeast Asian Studies 
37 no. 2 (1999), pp. 46-63. 
85 In fact, the decision to disengage from political and social realities by focussing on 
the development of personal piety was a decisive and significant moment that Jemaah 
Tarbiyah’s activists often consider a stage of kahfi, or withdrawal preparatory to action. 
Interview with Rahmat Abdullah, Jakarta, 11 May 2003.  
86 Interview with Akswendi, Surabaya, 13 March 2003.  
87 Ibid. 
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in order to build gradual and small clusters of cells leading eventually 
to a massive network.88  
One of the most interesting phenomena of Indonesian Islam in the 
1990s has been the rise of the religious movement called Jemaah 
Tarbiyah in the campuses of secular universities. This name is not a 
formal name of a movement but rather Muslim activists in campuses 
reportedly acknowledged this group as Jemaah Tarbiyah or ikhwa>n.89 
One activist of Jemaah Tarbiyah stated: “We do not name our group, 
and even the name ‘Jemaah Tarbiyah’ did not come from us; it is other 
groups who have named us.”90 
It emerged in the mid 1980s, when certain cadres made first 
contact with and experienced religious training under the moderate 
wing of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt. Jemaah Tarbiyah proved itself 
able to channel enthusiastic Muslim students in the state universities by 
providing religious training and outreach programs. Since the 1990s, 
activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah have succeeded in gaining control of intra 
campus student organisations. They have organised Islamic programs 
and activities for students based in small prayer rooms in campuses 
and have founded a Forum for Islamic Studies in many faculties. In 
order to organise Islamic activities among the universities in Java and 
the Outer Islands, they also began to control the Forum for 
Coordinating Campus Predication, Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga 
Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK). Subsequently, through student general 
elections, they have been able to take over the central leadership of 
student senate organisations at the faculty and university level. In 1998, 
after the fall of the Soeharto regime, Jemaah Tarbiyah activists who 
were active in FSLD founded an extra-campus organisation, the 
Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI).  
The pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah are neither from abangan families 
nor secular backgrounds. They have inherited santri traditions but have 
gone through different religious and intellectual experiences from their 
forbears. They are the children and grandchildren of both traditionalist 
and modernist santri of the 1950s and 1960s. In describing his family’s 
                                                 
88 Liddle, “The Islamic Turn,” p. 624. 
89 See “Banyak Jalan Menuju Kehidupan Islami,” Suara Hidayatullah, August 2000. 
90 Interview with Aus Hidayat, Depok, 15 May 2003. 
  
Yon Machmudi 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 02, Number 01, June 2008 
96 
religious background, one Jemaah Tarbiyah activist who was a student 
of the Institute of Technology, ITS, Surabaya in 1982, stated 
My family is a transitional one. My grandfather was a 
religious leader associated with Masyumi and a pious 
person. In contrast, my father and mother probably had 
changed [their orientation]. They are like ordinary people in 
general. [They were] actively involved in non-religious 
organizations and middle class groups.91 
On relations between Islam and the state, this group tends to 
believe that Islam contains both dimensions of religion and state (al-di >n 
wa al-dawlah). While holding the view of the inseparable links between 
Islam and politics, Jemaah Tarbiyah believes that Islam does not 
provide a detailed explanation of political and governmental matters. 
The function of the state is to assure and maintain the survival of 
religion, while the Islamic parties are a necessary means to bring 
gradual changes in the state to take a more open stance towards Islam. 
It was for that reason that after Soeharto’s resignation and the end of 
his regime in 1998, Jemaah Tarbiyah transformed itself into a political 
party, assuming the name of the Justice Party, Partai Keadilan (PK). 
This was later changed in 2003 into the Prosperous Justice Party, Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS).  
Conclusion 
The emergence of various categories of santri dating from the early 
establishment of the Soeharto regime to the current situation in 
Indonesia has shown the dynamics of the santri in Indonesia. This 
phenomenon is not monolithic but rather has involved many forms of 
cultural interaction and adaptation. The case of Jemaah Tarbiyah also 
has shown this tendency, since it shows how its global inclination 
meets at the interface with local Indonesian traditions.  
The processes of Islamisation in Indonesia remain an interesting 
subject to study. They represent different groups and religious 
orientations but have same interests, in particular on how they see the 
role of Islam in society and its relation with the state.  Therefore, their 
presence in Indonesia should not bring conflict among different 
Islamic groups. They are assumed to contribute in enriching the 
                                                 
91 Interview with Sigit Susiantomo, Surabaya, 17 March 2003. 
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practice of Islam in Indonesia and become model for their fellow 
around the world, including Muslims in the Middle East. [] 
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